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Abstract 
Having done an analysis on the security vulnerabilities of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
through a desynchronization and an impersonation attacks, it is revealed that the secret information (i.e.: 
secret key and static identifier) shared between the tag and the reader is unnecessary. To overcome the 
vulnerability, this paper introduces Shelled Lightweight Random Value (SLRV) protocol; a mutual 
authentication protocol with high-security potentials conforming to  electronic product code (EPC) Class-1 
Generation-2 Tags, based on lightweight and standard cryptography on the tag’s and reader’s side, 
respectively. SLRV prunes de-synchronization attacks where the updating of internal values is only 
executed on the tag’s side and is a condition to a successful mutual authentication. Results of security 
analysis of SLRV, and comparison with existing protocols, are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a technology highly demanded in numerous 
applications and domains and therefore is under a continuous and rapid development [1-4]. 
Securing RFID tags against security threats is considered the main obstacle facing the 
widespread adoption of RFID technology [5-11], where hundreds of RFID protocols have been 
proposed and focused on providing a secure contact between readers and tags over the 
insecure radio channel. Nevertheless, due to the limitations of tags in terms of circuitry (gate 
equivalents), storage, and power consumption, the design of an efficient and secure mutual 
authentication protocol presents an immense challenge. Designing security protocols is even 
more challenging for low-cost technologies such as the lightweight RFID security 
protocolswhereby the tags imposes stronger hardware and memory limitations. Among the set 
of risks linked to RFID technology, privacy and de-synchronization are the most challenging as 
the majority of designed protocols fail to offer protection against these threats.  
RFID tags compliant with EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen-2 in short ) are based on 
transponders with limited resources. In detail, Gen-2 tags only support a 16-bit pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG), a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check code (CRC), and bitwise 
operations such as XOR, AND, and OR [12].  
Several protocols were proposed with the aim of securing Gen-2 tags. Unfortunately the 
majority of these protocols failed either to fulfill Gen-2 requirements or to satisfy the claimed 
security properties. For instance, [13] presented a protocol using a PIN password to securize 
the communication. This protocol suffers from several attacks as the ones mentioned in [14] and 
[15].  First, it was vulnerable to a de-synchronization attack as a consequence of the weak 
updating mechanism of the secret keys and shared values. Secondly, it does not offer 
protection against replay attacks and a passive attacker can reuse tokens from previous 
sessions. Thirdly, it was susceptible to a traceability attack since tags respond with the same 
value every time – in this attack, the attacker has to intercept the updating message and the tag 
would respond with a constant value. 
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Yeh et al.’s protocol [16] aims to secure EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard. Similar to many 
previously proposed protocols, it can be categorized under the class of lightweight mutual 
authentication protocols, following the classification proposed in [17]. In this category, it is 
assumed that tags can generate a random number but they do not have the computational 
resources to support on-board hash function. On the other hand, and similar to other lightweight 
RFID authentication protocols, Yeh et al.’s scheme is designed with a new parameter 
representing a database index value. 
 
1.1. Vulnerability of Yeh et al.’s Protocol 
Naser et al. [18] showed how the protocol is vulnerable against de-synchronization and 
impersonation attacks. The attacks can be conducted by a malicious reader, which mainly 
forwards message and does simple modifications exploiting the weaknesses of the bitwise XOR 
operations. 
 
1.2. De-synchronization Attack 
Yeh et al.’s protocol was designed using two sets of authentication and access keys to 
combat DoS attack, which causes a de-synchronization state between the tag and the server. 
The authors in [16] criticized the fact that its predecessor scheme (i.e., Chien and Huang’s 
protocol [14]) updated the key values (Kold and Pold) on every successful mutual authentication 
session at the database side.  Motivated by this, Yeh et al. proposed to add a validation criterion 
for this updating mechanism to solve the de-synchronization attack, which Chien and Chen’s 
protocol suffer, and is based on the usage of the new values of D, E, and Ci. Nevertheless, 
despite these validation tokens, we, in this paper, show how replay attacks can de-synchronize 
the protocol. The used adversary (malicious reader) has to be able to interrupt and forward 
messages only, and it does not need to have the capability to communicate with the database. 
This adversary will execute two session procedures in one session. That is, both communication 
sessions are executed almost in parallel but with only a slight difference in time:  
In the (i+1)th authentication session, the malicious reader will intercept the last message 
from the database and throw away M2 message to keep the tag using the same index value 
Ci+1. At the same time, the database will update its local parameters, specifically Cold would be 
Cnew, and Ci+1, and its Cnew would be Ci+2. 
In a slightly posterior session (almost a parallel session), the malicious reader will 
resend a new Message 3. However, instead of containing (V, M1, D, Ci, E, NR), it will send (V, 
M1, DRND, Ci, ERND, NR), which will allow the database to understand that it is a new 
session. These values (i.e., V, M1, DRND, Ci, ERND, and NR) will facilitate the tag to be 
authenticated by the database because NR continues to represent the same values from the 
eavesdropped session. NT will become NTRND, which is correctly used in D and E messages. 
Due to modified Message 3 sent by the reader, the database will update its Cnew value based on 
the Cx (in this case, X=old) from Ci+2 to Ci+3. At the same time, the malicious reader will forward 
the stored M2 message to the tag, causing the tag to update its values from (Ki+1, Pi+1 and Ci+1) 
to (Ki+2, Pi+2 and Ci+2).  
At this step the tag will store Ci+2 as index value, and the database will keep the values 
Ci+1 and Ci+3. Therefore, the tag and the database lost its synchronization and this is permanent. 
In fact, the tag can never be identified because the search index stored into its memory is 
different from the two indices (old and new) stored in the database. 
 
1.3. Impersonation Attack 
Tag impersonation attack is conducted by a dishonest reader. The key points of this 
attack are based on the use of NT nonce in both D and E tokens and the abusive use of the 
bitwise XOR operations.  Bitwise operations like XOR are linear functions, which are vulnerable 
to active and passive attacks. The proposed attack is sketched below:  
a) (i + 1)th authentication phase  
(1) R    Tagx: NR 
(2) Tag  R: M1, D, Ci, E 
 M1= PRNG (EPCSNR)Ki 
 D = NTKi 
 E = NTPRNG(CiKi) 
(3) R   DB: V, M1, D, Ci, E, NR 
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(4) DB  R: M2, Info 
(5) R   Tagx: Attack 
The attack can be performed using two methods. The first is by preventing the reader 
from forwarding any messages to the tag. Alternatively, the adversary can interrupt the last 
message and send a fraudulent message containing an incorrect value of M2. At this point, the 
targeted tag is isolated and the malicious reader can replace and impersonate the original tag 
by computing simple bitwise XOR operations as described in the following.  
b) (i + n)th authentication phase (n>2) 
Basically the fraudulent reader simulates that the tag always incorrectly receives the 
message M2. Therefore, the updating phase is not run in the tag and previous M1 message is 
valid. M1, D, E, NR, and V are the picked values of a previous legitimate session. After the 
reception of M2, the reader block this message and simulates the tag incorrectly received M2. 
After that, the fraudulent reader sends M1, DRND, ERND, NR, V, where RND represents an 
arbitrary random value. The tag is authenticated since M1 is legitimate. The random number NT' 
associated to this session is the bitwise XOR between NT and RND. We sketch the process 
below:   
 
DBR: M2, Info Fake R DB: M1, DRND, ERND, NR, V 
 
The proposed attack can be executed indefinitely as the original scheme does not 
assume any threshold for the number of times the M2 message can be interrupted, altered, or 
incorrectly received. 
 
 
2. Research Method 
In an accumulative effort to enhance the security of Yeh et al.’s protocol, we propose 
two possible solutions for the desynchronization threat. The first is the creation of two extra 
fields for each tag’s record in the database as a short memory for random numbers (NR, NT) 
generated in the (i+1)th session. The short memory using these two extra fields (NR_last, NT_last) 
indicates that they will be overwritten at every successful mutual authentication (i+2)th session. 
The second solution involves the modification of the formulas for D and E values, executed by 
the tag, as not to be able to misuse or manipulate these during transaction (e.g., by using a non-
rectangular function such as a rotation function). However, these proposed solutions are not 
completely effective; other attacks can be configured based on the original protocol plot design, 
which depends on updating values of common secrets between tag and backend database.  
Motivated by the abovementioned disadvantage in enhancing Yeh et al.’s protocol, a 
new protocol was developed utilizing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of existing 
protocols, particularly the vulnerabilities in the said protocol (See Figure 1). The goal in creating 
the new protocol was to produce a lightweight one with higher security level and lower 
computational power requirements for the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard for RFID tags. 
The protocol presents transactions of the original stored data combined with random values, 
and encapsulated in shell values capable of transporting hidden data between the tag and the 
reader without compromising or revealing this data. Based on its characteristics, the proposed 
protocol is named as Shelled Lightweight Randomized Value (SLRV), which focuses on 
securing the channel between the tag and the reader, the reader and the database, and vice-
versa. We introduce the following notations for the protocol: 
a) Ψ : encryption value holding the EPCS 
b) Ke  :  encryption key with fixed value for all tags stored in the database 
c) Ni :  random number generated by the database at every (i)th session 
d) Rtemp :  temporary value calculated by the database at every (i+1)th session 
e) K1, K2: two distinct secret keys with fixed values for each tag stored in the tag and 
the corresponding record in the database We recommend that these two secret 
keys (K1, K2) be changed from time to time to maintain a higher security level. 
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Figure 1. Shelled Lightweight Randomized Value (SLRV) protocol 
 
 
The protocol consists of the following phases:  
 
 
2.1. Initialization Phase 
For each tag, denoted as Tagx, the manufacturer randomly generates two secret keys 
and EPCS values and stores these in the tag in a corresponding record in the database 
identified by EPCS. The manufacturer likewise generates an encryption key Ke and stores it in 
the database, generates a random number and stores it in the tag as Ni, and generates an 
encryption value using the formula Ψ=ENC(EPCSNi)Ke and stores it in the tag as Ψ. 
In the (i + 1)th  tag authentication phase  
1) R Tagx: NR 
The reader generates a nonce random NR to the tag as a challenge. Upon receiving NR, 
the tag generates a random number NT to be used in the following formulas: 
a) αi=Rot(Rot(NTEPCSK1)NR⨁K2),K1 
b) βi=PRNG(NT||NR||EPCS||Ψ i)K2 
Where αi is used to hide NT and βi is used to check the message integrity by the 
database. 
2) Tag R: Ψi, αi, βi and Ni 
When the reader receives the message, it will compute V value using V=H(RIDNR), 
which is the hashed value of the reader’s ID (RID) XORed with NR. The reader then forwards it 
with contents of Messages 1 and 2 to the backend database for the purpose of tag identification.  
3) R  DB: Ψi , αi , Ni , βi ,V, and NR 
Once Message 3 is received, the database performs the following operations 
sequentially, where each is conditioned to the success of its predecessor operation or else will 
abort the session: 
 
2.2. Reader Authentication Phase 
The database iteratively picks up each stored RID and computes H(RIDNR) to 
authenticate the reader based on the value of V.For each RID in DB test the following formula: 
H(RIDNR)=? V 
 
2.3. Tag Identification Phase 
The database extracts EPCS value using the following formula: 
 
EPCs=Dec(Ψi)keNi 
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The reader uses this formula to extract EPCs by decrypting Ψi using Ke and Ni, and 
locks up the tag’s corresponding secret keys in the database. Subsequently, it starts the mutual 
authentication phase only if the EPCs are verified. 
 
2.4. Tag Authentication Phase 
The database uses the values it acquired (EPCS, K1, K2) and resolves Ai shell by 
inversing the function Ai=ROT(ROT(NTEPCSK1, NR^K2), NRK1) to extract the value of the 
random number NT. Next, the reader checks the integrity of the message by verifying Bi value 
using the following formula: 
 
PRNG(NT||NR||EPCs||Ψi)K2=? βi 
 
2.5. Tag updating Phase 
The database authenticates the tag, creates a new random value (Ni+1), and uses K1, 
K2, and NT to calculate Rtemp using the following formula: 
 
Rtemp=Rot(Rot(Nt⨁NR,K2),K2⨁K1) 
 
The database then creates new tag parameters for the values (Ψi+1 , γi, and Info) 
sequentially using the following: 
a) Ψi+1 = Enc(EPCSNi+1)Ke 
b) γi=PRNG(Ψi+1 || αi || Rtemp||Ni+1) 
c) Info= (RIDDATA) 
Where γi is used to check the message integrity by the database. 
1) DBR:Ψi+1 , γi, Ni+1 , and Info 
When the reader receives Message 4, it obtains DATA from the info field by inversing 
the formula DATA=infoRID using the RID stored in it. It forwards Ψi+1, γi+1, Ni+1 to the tag. 
2) R Tag: Ψi+1, γi+1, Ni+1 
When Message 5 is delivered, the tag recalculates Ntemp using the following formula: 
 
Rtemp=Rot(Rot(NTNR,K2),K2K1) 
 
Next, the tag checks the integrity of the message by verifying Gi value using the 
following formula: 
 
PRNG(Ψi+1AiRtemp)=?γi 
 
If γi value verification failed, the tag presumes manipulation in the message and 
therefore aborts the session. Otherwise, the tag completes mutual authentication, authenticates 
the database, and concludes the session in the final phase (Tag Updating) by updating its 
values and overwriting the old values as the following: 
a) Ψi=Ψi+1 
b) Ni=Ni+1 
As illustrated in Figure 1, two shells (α and γ) are generated in every session. This 
makes the embedded values difficult to predict, and these values would be useless if obtained 
after the session is terminated. Furthermore, there are three verification tokens — V, β, and γ — 
that allow the system to terminate unsuccessful session in four positions: EPCs lock up in 
reader authentication, tag identification, tag authentication, and tag updating. These tokens start 
a new session in another timeframe. 
 
 
3. Security Analysis 
We conducted security analysis against the most relevant threats discussed in previous 
literature. Analysis was conducted by investigating each attack and its requirements and 
properties in the following categories: 
User data confidentiality: Secret keys K1 and K2 are carefully hidden inside α, β, and γ. In every new session, the keys are mixed with two different random numbers NT and NR. 
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Moreover, if any of the sub-messages in α, β, or γ was broken, tag identity will remain 
anonymous to the adversary. This is because the tag EPCs was XORed with a random number 
and subsequently encrypted using a secret key that exists only in the reader’s database. 
Therefore, the tag’s identity can be recognized only by legitimate readers. 
Tag anonymity: Sub-messages are updated in every session’s transaction, and tag-
reader-database messages are mixed with random numbers. As a result, the adversary is 
unable to recognize the tag’s location or trace it unless the adversary continues to interrupt the 
communication between the same tag and any legitimate reader; this leads to the transmission 
of the same message values of Ψi and Ni every time. This scenario was not considered of any 
considerable value and had been ignored in most previous studies in the domain since the tag 
was unable to randomize itself due to the limited recourse. An in-depth analysis of all these 
scenarios has been given in detail in [19]. 
Mutual authentication and data integrity: Our mutual authentication protocol can be 
performed only between legitimate readers and legitimate tags owing to the sub-messages α, β, 
and γ; these are generated using the common secret keys K1 and K2, which are only held in the 
tag and backend database and not communicated in plain values over an open channel. In 
addition, verifying the values of β and γ composed by the tag and the database, respectively, 
provides strong data integrity validation. 
Forward security: It is not possible for an adversary to infer any data patterns from 
past communications among the tag, reader, and database. This is because any previous data 
sent in one session will have no meaning in any subsequent sessions; each message is based 
on a random number that is checked for integrity for the session it was created in. Therefore, 
the integrity check will recognize that the value is not created during the same session, and it 
consequently will terminate the session unsuccessfully. Moreover, Keys K1 and K2 are not 
dropped. However, they are difficult to obtain and can be changed frequently, rendering this 
attack quite impossible. Assuming the tag is somehow compromised; there remain several 
unknown data variables in the server, such as Ke. 
Resistance to replay attacks: An adversary may eavesdrop on any of the exchanged 
messages. However, it would not be useful to send it back to either the database or the tag. 
This is because each message is based on random numbers that are changed in every 
successful authentication session. Accordingly, a replay attack can be detected immediately 
once the message is received by either the tag or the database. 
 Data-update-confirmation and desynchronization: Majority of recent authentication 
protocols require updating the secret keys’ values between the tag and reader. Cases where 
transmitted data had been modified or even interrupted lead to desynchronization. A 
desynchronization attack is the first vulnerability that commonly appears in all current protocols. 
In our protocol, the tag does not require updating of its local data in other entities. Moreover, 
even if any of these messages are modified or interrupted, any modification can be discovered 
easily when the values of V, βi, and γi are verified. Interruptions will not make any difference 
because tag data will be updated only after receiving and verifying the last message. Thus, the 
reader is never affected and always obtains the original EPCs for every new session. 
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks and disclosure attacks: Man-in-the-middle 
attacks can not affect SLRV protocol since all exchanged messages are verified and all 
modifications can be simply detected. Similarly, in a disclosure attack when an attacker makes 
changes in any message sent from database to tag or vice versa, SLRV protocol will detect any 
alteration and ignore the message. 
A significant aspect of SLRV is that it is based on classical cryptography primitives on 
the database server’s side. At the same time, the protocol is based on lightweight cryptography 
on the tag’s side. More precisely, the protocol uses a combination of triangular and non-
triangular functions. Non-triangular functions use a double-rotation function instead of the simple 
XOR function to obtain a greater diffusion effect and combat cryptanalysis of the protocol [12, 
19]. Utilizing computational capabilities on the database server’s side for using classical 
cryptography primitives and using a triangular and non-triangular functions collectively provide a 
higher security and protect against all known kinds of disclosure attacks that other protocols fail  
to defend against. Additionally, a meaningless message cannot affect the tag or reader, but only 
results in ending the current session unsuccessfully, enabling a new session to begin in another 
timeframe. 
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Database loading: Finally, to cover all possible threats to SLRV, an adversary can 
perform database loading attacks by modifying any of the values in the message forwarded 
from the tag. This will either result in performing excessive EPCs lock-up processes in the 
database for invalid EPCs when manipulating the Ψi or Ni values, or in the verification of a 
manipulated PRNG value(s). However, this attack will not produce a significant effect because 
the SLRV uses a binary search algorithm for EPCs lockup, which is moderately fast where the 
lockup complexity is O(log n). Furthermore, the database in SLRV maintains the assumption 
that all values are fixed once added, EPCs are serialized, and data are indexed. Therefore, it 
results in a complexity value of O(1) for EPCs lockup, which minimizes the effect of DoS 
attacks.  
Comparison with related protocols, such as Juels Protocol, Duc Protocol, etc., is 
summarized in Table 1. SLRV covers well all aspects of security being considered from 
confidentiality to the database loading aspect. 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Lightweight Authentication Protocol 
 Confidentiali
ty 
Anonymi
ty 
Authenticati
on 
Forwar
d 
Securit
y 
Repla
y 
Attack
s 
Desynchronizati
on 
and DoS 
MIM
A 
DB 
Loadin
g 
Juels 
protocol 
o x o x x x x x 
Duc et al. o o x x x x x x 
Lies et al. x x x x x x x x 
Sun and 
Ting 
x o o o o x o x 
Karthikey
an and 
Nestenko 
o x x x x x x x 
Chien and 
Chen 
o o x x x x x x 
Yeh et al. o o x x x x x o 
SLRV o o o o o o o o 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have proposed SLRV as a new lightweight authentication protocol capable of 
providing transactions of shelled values able to transport encapsulated encrypted private data 
between the tag, the reader, and the database without compromising the data. This guarantees 
privacy and anonymity of the tags’ holder. The main advantage offered by this protocol is that 
each session is considered an atom entity where no data from previous sessions are stored 
after session termination. In addition, no data values can be changed on the tag’s side until all 
transactions have been executed and validated successfully, ensuring data integrity on the 
RFID tag, reader, and backend database entities at all times. Comparing to previous protocols 
in the lightweight RFID field, the proposed protocol (SLRV) covers all aspects of security. 
Additionally, we urge protocol designers to check their protocols against compatibility 
with standards carefully (e.g., EPC-C1G2 or ISO/IEC 18006-C), bearing in mind that the design 
of a secure and efficient RFID authentication protocol is not a simple issue but a complicated 
challenge that requires in many cases a trade-off between objectives. 
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